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The Judicial Article:
The Proposal for Merit Selection of Judges in Illinois
By Kenneth A. Manaster

KENNETH A. MANASTER is a graduate of Harvard
University (A.B. 1963, LL.B. 1966) and is associated
with the firm of Leibman, Williams, Bennett, Baird and
Minow. Following graduation from law school, he
studied on a Fulbright fellowship in Lima, Peru, and
then served as law clerk to United States District Court
Judge Bernard M. Decker. He is a member of the Joint
Committee on Judicial Article and of the Association's
Committee on Candidates. He also served in 1969 as
associate counsel to the Special Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois.

The lawyers of Illinois have known
for a long while that the judicial system is not what it should be. In 1970,
probably more so than at any other
time in this century, this knowledge is
no longer the exclusive property of the
lawyers. Citizens' groups, the press,
leaders of the state legislative and
executive branches, and the "man on
the street" as well, speak of "the crisis
in our courts" and "the shadow cast on
the courts."' The Supreme Court of
Illinois has found itself compelled to
take unprecedented steps in order
"that the confidence of the bar and
the public in the integrity of this Court
not be further impaired." 2 There can
be little doubt that the revelations regarding Justices Solfisburg and Klingbiel and Judge Kizas reflect serious
inadequacies in the judicial system,
particularly in the working for selection and removal of judges.

____

The organized Bar of Illinois for
over 20 years has worked vigorously
to restructure the machinery for selecting our judges.3 The main purpose
of these efforts has been to improve
the quality of our judges and, accordingly, the quality of justice in this
state. In 1952, the Chicago Bar Association and the Illinois State Bar Association announced their support for
a merit selection plan for judicial positions. Although the political realities
of the late 1950's and the 1960's required the Bar at times to concentrate
on much-needed administrative restructuring of the courts, the Bar's
early commitment to obtain outstanding judges through a merit selection
plan has remained firm. 4 In 1970, with
public demand for judicial reform
aroused by the proven misconduct of
a few judges, and with the Constitutional Convention charged to reassess
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the basic structure of Illinois government, the Bar must again insist upon
judicial reform that will bring us better judges.
No one would say that all our judges
fall below the standards we are entitled to demand of them; there are
many capable and even outstanding
men on the bench in Illinois. It is difficult to dispute the proposition, however, that the present system for selection of judges has not produced as
many outstanding men as judges as
we could have, though we know such
men are with us at the Bar. A proven
system for placing qualified men on
the bench is available in the merit
selection plan which the Chicago Bar
Association and the Illinois State Bar
Association presented before the Judiciary Committee of the Constitutional
Convention in Springfield beginning
on February 3, 1970.

The Plan and Its Rationale
The main features of the merit selection plan are that judges shall be nominated by independent commissions of
laymen and lawyers appointed, respectively, by the Governor and the Bar.
The commission in each judicial circuit will make an intensive search for
the best qualified lawyers for judicial
vacancies and will submit three names
to the Governor for each opening. The
Governor will then promptly make the
selection of the judge from the nominees submitted to him. Within a short
time after selection by the Governor,
the new judge will go before the
voters, without a candidate opposing
him, on the issue of whether or not
he should be retained in office. If he
is retained, he then serves a full term
before facing the voters on the retention issue again if he wishes to con-

tinue in his post.
These are the bare outlines of the
plan as proposed to the Constitutional
Convention. The lawyers and laymen
who favor this plan, as well as those
who now doubt its wisdom, can best
discuss it only after they have familiarized themselves with the main provisions of the plan as prepared by the
Joint Committee on Judicial Article
of the Chicago Bar Association and
Illinois State Bar Association. Sections 10 and 11 of the proposed plan,
on "Selection and Tenure of Judges"
and "Judicial Nominating Commissions," respectively, are set forth below in the Appendix following this
article.
There is one overriding, affirmative
reason why the merit plan should be
adopted at the Convention and approved by the voters: The plan provides the best means for selection of
the best possible judges in a manner
consistent with the ideals of democracy. Our immediate goal is to obtain
outstanding judges; yet our greater
goal is government with the participation and consent of the governed.
The merit plan harmonizes these
goals. Regrettably, the system of popular election of judges now in effect
in Illinois has been proven to completely elevate the appearance of
democratic process at the expense of
the goal of outstanding judges. 5
Politics and Democracy
The merit plan establishes nominating commissions with the sole responsibility of finding the best nominees
for judicial posts. The intellectual and
personal characteristics of a potential
nominee, his experience at the Bar,
his scholarship, his standing as a man
highly respected in his community-
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all of these and more criteria relevant
to possible service as a judge can be
impartially and thoughtfully examined
by the commission members. The
commission members are beholden to
no one but the public, which must
carefully evaluate the nominees as
well as the Governor's selections.
There are those who say the commission members will be "politically"
indebted to the Governor who appoints them and to his party. The proposed plan contains a number of features which eliminate any such possibility:
First, no more than half of the lay
members appointed by the Governor
may be of the same political party;
thus political balance is to be maintained in each Commission.
Second, the terms of members are
six years, staggered at the outset with
half of the initial appointments for
only three years; thus within a few
years the commissions will contain
laymen appointed by different governors of different political parties.
Third, the lawyer members are not
appointed by the Governor, but are
elected by the Bar; this not only provides commission members qualified
to assess the professional credentials
of prospective nominees, but also further ensures the commissions' independence from the Governor and the
political parties.
Fourth, commission members are
barred from renewed service on a
commission, and from judicial service as well, for three years following
service of a full term on a nominating
commission; this safeguard removes
any incentive for a member to curry
favor with his fellow members and
the Governor.

The independence of the commissions thus promotes rational, impartial selection of the best men, without
political favors or debts coming into
play. The question may be asked,
however, whether this built-in independence is consistent with democracy. The answer is that this independence is fully consistent with our
ideals of effective democracy. The answer lies first in the Governor's responsib ility, and vulnerability, to the
voters; second in the voters' right to
remove a new judge from office at the
initial or subsequent retention elections; and third in the force of informed public opinion overseeing and
influencing the actions of the commissions and the Governor at all times.
As to the Governor, the merit plan
thrusts him into the spotlight as soon
as a commission submits three names
for a vacancy. He must immediately
make the names public, and must
make his selection within 28 days.
Unlike the secret slate-making of our
political parties, the Governor's alternatives will be known to the public. A Governor who makes unwise
selections of judges risks being thrown
out of office at the polls. It is far easier
for the public to accomplish that than
it is for the voters to diminish the
power of the party leaders who now
handpick the judicial slates the voter
finds facing him on election day. In
many instances, especially in Chicago, the public does not even know
who the party slate-makers are. Beyond this, who of us at the Bar has
not found himself bewildered at the
array of names offered as judicial candidates on election day? Must not
similar confusion, and a great sense of
futility, prevail in the voting public
Chicago Bar Record
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at large? The merit plan clearly identifies the nominators and the nominees, giving the public the information
it is entitled to have.
The Governor is directly accountable to the voters and must consider
not only immediate comment on his
choice but also the effects of that
choice at the next election to be faced
by him and his party. 6 The public
will know exactly which nominee he
chose and how that nominee's qualifications compared to the others'. As
one experienced observer has noted,
"Even the most politically minded
governor knows that good appointments are a source of political strength
and he wants them to be as good as
possible." 7 It is the will of the people,
fortified by the relevant information
the commissions will make available,
which will ultimately control the Governor's choice. This is democracy in a
truer, more responsible sense than we
have now when political chieftains
choose the judicial candidates and a
small proportion of the voters submissively ratify the politicians' choices.
The retention vote provision, which
already is in effect in Illinois, will
have greater meaning for the voters
when the initial selection by the Governor is made publicly from qualified
nominees. It is probably true that the
retention vote system will very seldom
turn a judge out of office. Actually, it
is only in the rare instance that a
judge should fail to be retained in office-at least this is true if the initial
choice of the judge is wisely made.
Our judges deserve security of tenure
in office; their independence in judging is promoted by it, and this independence is indispensable to the protection of our liberties. One especially

wonders how seemly it is, in an age
in which so many civil litigants and
criminal defendants are charging govermnent leaders at various levels with
violations of individual rights, for the
judges deciding these cases to have
been chosen for the bench by the very
same leaders being brought to judgment before them. The retention
scheme alone does not assure independence in our judges; the initial
manner of choice is all-important. 8
If judges are sensibly and impartially selected at the outset, however,
they should be retained in office unless they are guilty of serious dereliction of duty or personal misconduct.
Thus it is not necessarily wrong, or a
defect of the merit plan, that judges
ordinarily will be retained in office
by the voters. The safety valve of the
retention vote is but another aspect of
the merit plan's preservation of the
rights of the people. 9
The merit plan, in short, will provide a sensible, open, and impartial
way to select the best possible judges.
At the same time it will provide the
people of Illinois with the facts and
the voting power necessary to keep
the selection of our judges always subject to the democratic will.
Objections to the Plan
It might be said that there are four
main objections to the merit plan: (1)
The judiciary is perfectly fine as it is
and will not be significantly improved
by the plan. (2) The plan will not
take politics out of the courts and
therefore will not produce better
judges. (3) The merit plan will not
produce better judges even if politics
are substantially absent from the selection process. (4) The plan is undemocratic and therefore objection-
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able, regardless of the results it produces.
My discussion of the plan thus far
meets each of these points: The present situation is not satisfactory; the
plan will substantially reduce the usual political considerations which are
irrelevant to a man's qualifications for
a judgeship; the plan has been proven
in Missouri and elsewhere to produce
more qualified, independent judges;
and the plan is more consistent with
effective democratic process than is
the present political election system.'0
A few other areas of objection and
doubt must also be considered.
One objection sometimes raised is
that a merit selection system will make
it almost impossible for members of
various ethnic groups, especially minorities, to become judges. The irrelevancy of this argument to the public's
need for a fair and qualified judiciary
should not be underestimated. Judges
do not, and should not, have "constituencies." The notion is inherently
contrary to the principle that a judge
must apply the law equally to all persons, regardless of their ethnic (or
political) backgrounds. It may further
be noted that on occasion minority
group judges are found leaning over
backwards to avoid the appearance,
and the reality, of preference for their
ethnic brethren. Finally, experience
in Missouri and other states, plus plain
common and political sense, indicate
that the nominating commissions' offerings and the Governor's selections
will produce an overall ethnic balance. Qualified men will be selected
regardless of, not because of, their
ethnic identity.
Perhaps a further word is warranted
regarding the question of politics

within the plan. The plan is not
wholly nonpolitical -the
Governor
will be involved, many well-known
lawyers and laymen active in their
communities will serve on commissions, most of the nominees will be
well-known figures, and the public,
the political parties, and the press will
assess al that is done, especially when
the Governor stands for re-election
and the judges stand for retention.
Politics is a salutary and necessary
part of the plan because it represents
public participation and control. Politics in the more limited sense of Bar
participation in the workings of the
plan will undoubtedly take place; this
"politics" is clearly more relevant and
more informed with respect to the
search for qualified judges than is the
politics of the established party organizations in any part of the state.
Politics will be out of the plan in the
usual, and irrelevant, context of judicial office viewed as a well-deserved
reward for party loyalty and political
labors.
There is another safety valve in the
proposed plan which further ensures
that qualified men will be our judges.
The proposal provides for an Illinois
Courts Commission consisting solely
of laymen and lawyers, that is, three
of the former and four of the latter.
The Governor is to appoint the lay
members, limiting members 'of the
same political party to no more than
two positions on the Commission. The
lawyers are to be nominated by representatives of the judicial nominating commissions, with the Governor
to make the selection from eight nominees submitted to him. Alternatively,
if the General Assembly so provides,
the lawyers of the State will elect the
Chicago Bar Record
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lawyer members. The Commission
will be permanently convened, with
power to initiate and receive complaints, investigate, hold public hearings and, where warranted, remove,
suspend, censure, or retire particular
judges. The broad powers and the independence of this commission provide a greater assurance than Illinois
has previously had that its judges'
conduct will be examined continuously by an effective watchdog commission.
The Needs of the '70s and Beyond
As our modern world changes in
faster and more complicated ways,
the conflicts our judges are called
upon to resolve seem to become more
compelling and more complex. We
need men of courage and vision on the
bench-men who are acutely aware
of the changes taking place in our society, yet who also realize the enduring worth of the basic principles of
our legal system. We need men who
will apply these principles to our conflicts, and who will themselves embody our highest ideals of judicial
sagacity and probity.
Many lawyers and laymen have
expressed surprise that some of the recent disclosures of judicial impropriety have rested fairly easily on a comfortable bed of public cynicism. One
wonders whether this cynicism has
been bred by a widespread feeling
that judicial choice at present is out
of the hands of the people. Fortunately, the cynicism has lately reached
such vast proportions that it has begun to turn to a renewed public demand for judicial reform. Clearly this
demand was one of the prime forces
which called the Constitutional Convention into being. The organized Bar

and various active civic groups have
not lost sight of the need for change
and once again are acting to bring
about the reforms the situation demands. The people of Illinois must
have a new Judicial Article that will
provide for the merit selection of
judges-judges who will be worthy of
the ideals of the people and of the
needs of the 1970's and beyond.
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APPENDIX

is fewer than three times the number of
vacancies, the names of those available shall
be listed. The Governor, immediately upon
receipt of the list, shall make it public and,
within 28 days after receipt of the list, shall
appoint from the list one person to fill each
vacancy. If an appointment is not made by
the Governor within the 28 days, the Supreme Court shall promptly make the appointment from the list.
(b) A judge appointed to fill a vacancy
shall serve an initial term ending on the
first Monday in December following the
next general election held after he has completed one year in office. He may at that
general election stand for retention in office
as hereinafter provided.
(c) Not less than six months prior to the
general election next preceding the expiration of his term of office, any judge previously elected or appointed may file in the
office of the Secretary of State a declaration
of candidacy to succeed himself, and the
Secretary of State, not less than 63 days
nrior to the election, shall certify the
judge's candidacy to the proper election
officials. At the election the name of each
judge who has filed a declaration shall be
submitted to the voters, on a special judicial ballot without party designation, on the
sole nuestion whether he shall be retained
in office for another term. The elections
shall be conducted in the appropriate judicial districts, circuits and counties. The af-

PROPOSED JUDICIAL ARTICLE VI
(Proposed Provisions)
SECTION 10.
SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES.
All judges shall be appointed by the Governor from nominees submitted by Judicial
Nominating Commissions, constituted as provided in Section 11, and may seek retention
in office as provided in this Section. The
General Assembly may provide by law for
a different system of selection and tenure,
but no such law shall be adopted except by
vote of two-thirds of the members elected
to each House, nor shall it become law until
first submitted to the electors at the next
general election and approved by a majority of those voting on the question.
(a) Whenever a vacancy occurs in the
office of judge, the administrative director
shall notify the chairman of the appropriate
Judicial Nominating Commission, who shall
forthwith convene the Commission. Within
56 days after receipt by the chairman of the
notification, the Commission shall submit to
the Governor a list containing the names of
three persons qualified for the office. If two
or more vacancies on the same court are to
be filled, the number of names on the list
shall be three times the number of vacancies. If the Supreme Court upon recommen-

dation of the Commission shall determine
that the number of qualified persons available
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firmative votes of a majority of the voters
voting on the question shall elect him to
the office for a full term commencing the
first Monday in December following the
election. Any judge who does not file a
declaration within the time herein specified,
or, having filed, fails of retention, shall vacate his office on the first Monday in December following the general election,
whether or not his successor shall yet have
qualified.
(d) If an incumbent does not file a declaration of candidacy within the time specified
above, the selection and appointment of his
successor, if any, shall proceed immediately
in a manner similar to that above provided
in this Section so that the successor may
take office as soon as the vacancy occurs.
(e) The office of any judge shall be
deemed vacant upon his death, resignation,
retirement, removal, or upon the conclusion
of his term without retention in office.
Whenever an additional judge is authorized
by law, the office shall be filled in the same
manner as in the case of a vacancy.
(f) Any law reducing the number of judges
of the Appellate Court in any district or the
number of Circuit judges in any circuit shall
be without prejudice to the right of judges
in office at the time of its enactment to seek
retention in office as hereinabove provided.
(Proposed Provisions)
SECTION 11.
JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONS.
There shall be Judicial Nominating Commissions in each Judicial District, and in
each Circuit, for nomination of judges for
the Supreme Court, Appellate Court, and
Circuit Courts, as follows:
(a) The Circuit Judicial Nominating Commission for each Circuit outside the First
Judicial District, to make nominations for
Circuit Court judges in each respective circuit, shall consist of six laymen, no more
than three of whom shall be members of
the same political party, and five lawyers.
(b) The District Judicial Nominating Commission for each judicial district other than
the First Judicial District, to make nominations for Appellate and Supreme Court
judges from each respective district, shall
consist of two lawyers and two laymen from
each Circuit Judicial Nominating Commission within the district, elected by each
Circuit Commission, and an additional lay
member appointed by the Governor from
any Circuit Commission within the district.
(c) The First District Judicial Nominating
Commission, to make nominations for the
Circuit. Apuellate and Supreme Court judges
from the District, shall consist of eleven
laymen, no more than six of whom shall be
members of the same political party, and
ten lawyers.
(d) The lay members of each Circuit
Commission and of the Commission for the
First Judicial District shall be appointed by

the Governor. The Governor shall designate
one of the lay members of each Commission as chairman. The chairman may vote
only in case of a tie. The term of any chairman shall be three years unless his remaining term as a member of the Commission
expires sooner. The lay members shall reside in the Circuit or District for which they
are appointed.
(e) The lawyer members of each Circuit
Commission and of the Commission for the
First Judicial District shall be chosen by
secret ballot by the members of the Bar
whose principal offices are in the appropriate circuit, in such manner as shall be provided by rules which shall be adopted by
the Supreme Court. The lawyer members
shall reside in the Circuit or District for
which they are chosen.
(f) In appointing the initial members of
each Commission, the Governor shall divide
the lay appointees into two groups and
shall designate one group to serve for three
years and one to serve for six years. As near
as may be, the groups shall be equal and
the number of members of one political
party shall not exceed half the number of
the group. The initial lawyer members shall
be divided into two groups equal as near as
may be, in such manner as the Supreme
Court shall provide, one group to serve for
three years and one to serve for six years.
Thereafter the terms of all members shall
be six years.
(g) A vacancy in the office of chairman
or member of the Commission shall be filled
for the unexpired term in the same manner
and subject to the same qualifications as
those originally chosen.
(h) No person who holds any office under,
or is an employee of, the United States or
this State or any municipal corporation or
political subdivision of this State or who
holds any official position in a political
party is eligible to serve on a judicial nominating commission. Compensation for service in the State militia or the armed forces
of the United States for such periods of
time as may be determined by rule of the
Supreme Court shall not be considered
compensation. No member of a judicial
nominating commission may be nominated
or appointed to judicial office for a period
of three years from the last day of his service on the commission. A member, having
served a full term of six years on a commission, may not be selected to serve on a
commission during the next three years.
(i) Members of commissions shall not receive any compensation for their services
but shall be entitled to reimbursement for
necessary expenses. The General Assembly
shall a)propriate funds to the Supreme
Court for such reimbursement and for other
administrative expenses of the commissions.
The commissions may conduct such investigations, and employ such staff members as
may be necessary to perform their duties.
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